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Seller's Warranty Liability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Should
Buyer's Merchant Status Affect
His Right of Recovery?
OLIN W. JONES*
I. INTRODUCTION
What are the limits of a seller's liability for breach of warranty
in goods transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code? The
question posed is not a new one; much debate has raged over the
past century between legal educators, commentators and the judi-
ciary as to the appropriate answer. Many discussions of damages
for breach of warranty in goods transactions involve some sort of
ominous hypothetical situation wherein the seller who supplied a
defective, fifty-cent bolt is being sued for the damages which re-
sulted from the long breakdown of a giant generator needed to op-
erate a factory. Whether or not the supplier of the defective bolt
will be held accountable for the enormous losses which may re-
sult from the factory shutdown is said to depend upon the appli-
cation of sections 2-714 and 2-715 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and to the latter section's claimed progenitor, Hadley v.
Baxendale.1
Over a century ago, the English Court of Exchequer attempted
to define the limits of the breacher's liability in the landmark
Hadley case. In essence, the court declared that the breaching
party was liable for all loss resulting from the breach which both
parties would have foreseen at the time of the contract as likely to
result from the breach. The rules enunciated in that case have
been subject to two diverse interpretations. One group of com-
mentators and judges interprets Hadley as defining liability limits
only in terms of foreseeability of the seller. Another group feels
that such an interpretation will lead to too harsh a result. They
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu,
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1. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
interpret Hadley as requiring more than foreseeability on the
part of the seller. Rather, they view the case as requiring either
an express or "tacit" agreement between the parties concerning
liability for some of the consequences which may result.
The issue has always been an important one to buyers and sell-
ers of goods. Recent events have made the seller's responsibility
more than just important - it has become critical. It is unneces-
sary to document the fact that since Hadley was decided, we have
developed and built industrial complexes and machinery far be-
yond the vision or imagination of those judges who rendered it in
1854. When a modern complex grinds to a halt, the consequences
may be enormous. The uncontrovertible fact is that today the ul-
timate consequences of selling are far greater than they were in
1854. We now make it relatively easy to find that the seller has
breached a warranty. Should we also make it easy to place on the
seller all its consequences, both general and special?
It is the purpose of this article to review the suggested answers
of legal scholars involved in the debate over the limits of warranty
liability and to suggest that the status of the aggrieved buyer
should be given greater weight in resolving the question. Should
the fact that the buyer is a merchant have any impact on the de-
bate? By focusing on the status of the buyer while attempting to
resolve the question, it is urged that the limits of the seller's war-
ranty liability should fall upon some middle ground of the debate
- between "foreseeability" and "tacit agreement."
Throughout this article the hypothetical fact situation should be
kept in mind. Restated, the situation supposes that a five-hun-
dred million dollar energy facility will be constructed on the coast
of California. Much of this installation will no doubt consist of
"transactions in goods"2 and indeed the entire project may be
analogized to such a transaction. 3 If so, all or part of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code will be pertinent.4 Assume that
one of the suppliers furnishes a fifty-cent bolt, and that a defect in
2. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1). "'Goods' means all things (including specially man-
ufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities
(Article 8) and things in action. . . ." Id.3. It is becoming commonplace to find courts using the principles of the
U.C.C. in non-goods transactions. There is often no valid reason to use one set of
principles in a contract for the construction and sale of a giant supertanker and
yet a different set of principles in a contract for the construction and sale of a
large apartment complex. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525
P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
4. See U.C.C. § 2-102. Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article ap-
plies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although
in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to oper-
ate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute
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the bolt causes losses to the purchaser. It is, of course, possible
that the losses were caused by the negligence of the bolt supplier.
In that event, even absent a contract between seller and buyer,
the seller of the bolt would have owed a duty to fabricate it in
such a manner so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm to
the energy company's interest.5
In our hypothetical situation, however, assume that the sup-
plier's duties arose out of the four corners of a contract document
in which one party was properly called a "buyer"6 and the other a
"seller ' 7 of goods. Assume also that the seller made a warranty
regarding the bolt, either express or implied; that the bolt did not
comply with the warranty and only in that sense was defective;
that the defective bolt is extremely difficult (expensive) to repair
or replace upon proper discovery of the defect; and that the in-
stallation is necessarily shut down for several months as a proxi-
mate result of the defect. Is our bolt supplier liable for all the
crushing direct and consequential damages?
II. "DIRECT" DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
A. "Value" Versus "Cost" as the Measure of Damages
One of the losses suffered by the buyer in our hypothetical fact
situation involves the defective bolt itself. It must either be re-
paired or replaced. The cost of such repair or replacement is the
buyer's "direct damage," one resulting immediately and proxi-
mately from the occurrence, and not remotely from some of the
consequences or effects thereof. The basis in law for that recov-
ery is found in the interaction between the Uniform Commercial
Code and principles of the common law of contracts. The relevant
section of the Code is 2-714 which sets forth the buyer's remedy
for damages resulting from a breach of warranty in regard to ac-
cepted goods. The section reads:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsec-
tion (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of
regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 323 (1965).
6. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (a). "Buyer means a person who buys or contracts to buy
goods."
7. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (d). "Seller means a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods."
events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which
is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at
the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods ac-
cepted and the value they would have had if they had been as war-
ranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under
the next section may also be recovered.
Subsections (1) and (2) are determinant in the matter of mea-
suring direct damage. Subsection (1) describes the damages
which may be had where the action is based on non-conformity of
tender. Official Comment 2 to Section 2-714 describes non-con-
formity of tender in this manner.
The "non-conformity" referred to in subsection (1) includes not only
breaches of warranties but also any failure of the seller to perform accord-
ing to his obligations under the contract. In the case of such non-conform-
ity, the buyer is permitted to recover for his loss "in any manner which is
reasonable."
When our hypothetical buyer brings an action for direct dam-
ages, one of his theories will be that seller's tender did not con-
form to its obligations under the contract. If that is his theory, the
Code does not mandate the use of any certain measure of dam-
ages. Rather, the Code simply tells the aggrieved party that he
may recover all direct damages which result "in the ordinary
course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable."8 This absence of Code specificity,
together with section 1-103 of the Code, triggers application of
common law principles of contract law. Section 1-103 reads:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capac-
ity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.
The Code seems to say that where non-conformity of tender is
claimed, the aggrieved buyer may have damages determined in a
reasonable manner, as that is ascertained by application of the
common law.
Under common law, two opposing damage measures are recog-
nized. They usually are referred to as "value" and "cost" meas-
ures. Under the value measure, the aggrieved party is allowed to
recover the difference in value between the item, as tendered, and
the value it would have had if it had met the contract require-
ments. Under the cost measure, the aggrieved party is allowed to
recover the reasonable cost of remedying the defects and the
bringing of the defective item up to contract specifications. Al-
though these measures are easy to state, they are more difficult to
8. U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
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apply due to the many and varied fact patterns which have
emerged.
Because it sets the tone for compensating aggrieved parties,
one of the major policies of the Code should be considered in de-
termining what measure of damages is appropriate. Section 1-106
states specifically that remedies are to be liberally administered:
The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or
by other rule of law.
The Official Comment to this section develops the theme of lib-
eral compensation and states its purpose is to "negate the unduly
narrow or technical interpretation of some remedial provisions of
prior legislation by providing that the remedies in this Act are to
be liberally administered to the end stated in the section."9 The
Code comment manifestly rejects the proposition that the proper
damage recovery is necessarily the smallest damage recovery. In-
stead, it embraces the concept that an aggrieved party is entitled
to be placed in as good a position as performance.
The Code's policy, together with existing case law, must be uti-
lized to determine the proper choice in the measure of damages
between a value measure and a cost measure. In our hypotheti-
cal case, for example, it seems clear that a value measure of dam-
ages is only about fifty cents. The cost measure, however, could
realistically be several hundred thousand dollars, or more.
B. Defining "Special Circumstances" Permitting Cost Measure
The bolt seller may well argue that the Code provides only one
measure of recovery for non-conforming goods accepted by the
buyer. Section 2-714(2) of the Code does indeed set forth the
value measure of damages. It states: "The measure of damages
for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of
acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount."
It seems clear that the "proximate damages" referred to in sec-
tion 2-714(2) means direct damages. This proposition is suffi-
ciently dealt with in Black's Law Dictionary: "Proximate damages
9. U.C.C. § 1-106(1), Comment 1.
are the immediate and direct damages and natural results of the
act complained of, and such as are usual and might have been ex-
pected." 10 However, a proper reading of section 2-714(2) along
with the relevant Official Comment makes it clear that the value
measure is not intended to be exclusive. Official Comment 3
states: "Subsection (2) describes the usual, standard and reason-
able method of ascertaining damages in the case of breach of war-
ranty but it is not intended as an exclusive measure.""
Since there are only two' measures of damages which apply to
the kind of problem presented by the hypothetical, if the value
measure is not exclusive then the cost measure may be an appro-
priate alternative under proper circumstances. The inclusion of
the terminology, "special circumstances," would therefore provide
an opportunity for the aggrieved buyer to recover a greater
amount of direct damages than the value measure would allow.
Unfortunately, the courts have not often addressed the problem
of the "special circumstances" allowing a shift from value to cost
measures. Professors White and Summers mention the problem
in their treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code:
In many cases, courts will find a ready measure of damages by using the
cost of repair that the buyer has incurred or will incur in order to bring
the goods up to snuff. In other cases the courts will have to turn to the
familiar but difficult standards for measuring value. In all such cases the
courts should give due concern to the particular needs of the buyer.
12
In a 1974 case,1 3 the Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut de-
scribed "special circumstances" as a Code-sanctioned means of
recovering greater direct damage than would be available through
the value measure. The court said:
The difference between the value of the goods delivered and that which
they would have had if they had complied with the warranty is not the ex-
clusive measure of damages in breach of warranty cases. The rule is more
generous when special circumstances are present. In essence, the loss di-
rectly and naturally resulting is the measure of damages. 14
Most courts do not attempt to define what is meant by "special
circumstances." In General Supply and Equipment Company,
Inc. v. Harry S. Phillips,15 roof panels for a greenhouse turned out
10. H. BLACK, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 469 (4th ed. 1968).
11. U.C.C. § 2-714(2), Comment 3 (emphasis added).
12. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 311 (1972).
13. Acme Pump Co. Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Sup. 69, 337
A.2d 672 (1974). National Cash Register Co. sold a defective bookkeeping machine
to plaintiff who sued for breach of warranty. The court allowed plaintiffs recovery
for the reasonable expenses of defending itself in an action by a finance company
for a deficiency judgment after the finance company had repossessed the book-
keeping machine. The court determined that the breach of warranty was a direct
cause of the repossession.
14. Id. at 677.
15. 490 S.W. 2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). The jury had awarded the plaintiff
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to be defective. The court allowed the cost of replacing the panels
after simply concluding:
In the instant case the ordinary measure of damages for breach of war-
ranty as stated in § 2-714(b) is not applicable because of special circum-
stances showing proximate damages of a different amount. The proximate
damages in this case consist of incidental and consequential damages as
provided by § 2-715.16
The court made no effort to determine what is meant by the
"special circumstances" of section 2-714(2); instead it found "a
proper case" under section 2-714(3) and applied the cost measure
of direct damages although classifying them as incidental dam-
ages.
Another Texas court, in the 1975 case of Lanphier Construction
Company v. Fowco Construction Company,17 emphasized the
"special circumstances" language of section 2-714(2), and ex-
plained why the normal formula giving the value measure was not
the appropriate one:
There is abundant evidence that Servtex knew the exact needs of Fowco
at the time of supplying the asphalt. Thus, Servtex could have reasonably
foreseen that if the asphalt proved defective and failed, the entire job
would have to be taken up and would have to be completely redone....
Since the asphalt was defective, it had no value .... In the instant case,
the ordinary measure of damages for breach of warranty stated in section
2.714(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code is not applicable because of
special circumstances showing proximate damages of a different
amount. 18
Thus the court reasoned that the "special circumstances" of sec-
tion 2-714(2) are satisfied by foreseeability on the part of the sup-
plier that more than the normal measure of damages would be
appropriate.
In Water Works & Industrial Supply Company v. Wilburn,19 a
Kentucky court of appeals found a breach of an implied warranty
for fitness regarding pipe gaskets and approved a jury award
which apparently included the expense of digging up the pipe, re-
filling and reblocking connections, and back filling. The court dis-
missed as unmeritorious the appellant's suggestion that liability
was limited to replacement costs only, saying: "Consequential
damages are recoverable for breach of implied warranty of fitness.
damages measured by the diminution in the cash market value of the greenhouse.
The appellate court reversed, stating that the proper measure of damages is the
replacement cost of the paneling.
16. Id. at 919.
17. 523 S.W. 2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
18. Id. at 42.
19. 437 S.W. 2d 951 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1969).
K.RS 355.2-715."2o Nowhere does the court explain why the sug-
gestion had no merit, nor does it explain its reference to conse-
quential damages as opposed to warranty damages which appear
to have been the damages claimed and awarded.2 1
In Appalachian Power Co. v. John Stewart Walker, Inc.,22 the
Virginia court did give some guidelines for choosing between the
two measures: "The test is the nature of the motivation which in-
duced the promisee to make the contract. If his primary interest
was the value of the result performance would have produced,
then the 'value' formula is applicable; if performance itself, then
the 'cost' formula." 23
This case seems to stand for the proposition that if the buyer
wants goods for purposes of resale, he is concerned with their
value because that is what determines the price he can obtain for
20. Id. at 955.
21. In General Supply, supra note 15, Lanphier Construction, supra note 17,
and Water Works, supra note 19, the courts cited either section 2-715(1) or 2-715(2)
as the legislative authority for the recovery of direct warranty damages. In Gen-
eral Supply, the remedy sought and awarded was the cost of replacing defective
panels. The court improperly based its award on 2-715(1), the Code's provision for
incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach. The cost of replacing the
defective panels was not the type of incidental expense provided for by 2-715.
Rather, it was simply the measure of damages for breach of warranty which is pro-
vided for by either 2-714(1) or (2).
Another instance can be found in the 1972 Georgia Court of Appeals case of
Southern Concrete Products Company v. Martin, 126 Ga. App. 534, 191 S.E. 2d 314
(1972). That case required bricks to be sandblasted in order to make them con-
form to the contract. The court said the cost of making repairs was recoverable as
consequential damages under section 2-715. Id. at 316. Again, that cost is not an
item of consequential damages, a subject discussed infra, but rather it is a meas-
ure of warranty damages as provided for by section 2-714.
Similarly, a California Court of Appeals in Camrosa County Water District v.
Southwest Welding and Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 951, 123 Cal. Rptr. 93
(1974), a case involving repairs necessary to correct defective water tanks, held
that a buyer who suffers damages for breach of warranty is entitled to
consequential damages which are reasonable and foreseeable. The reference to
consequential damages, which were not claimed, is not explained.
These cases reveal one of the major difficulties in working with the Uniform
Commercial Code. Assuredly, it codified many common law principles; some were
changed but others were not. Unfortunately, many courts, in interpreting a Code
section that sounds generally familiar, tend to ignore what may be rather precise
language in the Code. Under the Code, for example, incidental and consequential
damages are clearly recoverable, in a proper case, in addition to direct damages.
They are not, however, properly described as warranty damages. Section 2-714(3)
seems plain enough: "In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages
under the next section may also be recovered." (Emphasis added.)
22. 214 Va. 524, 201 S.E. 2d 758 (1974). In Appalachian Power, the supreme
court approved an award of damages based on the reduced value of a developer's
lots due to the utility company's failure to install underground service as agreed.
The electric company had argued that the proper measure of damages should
have been the cost of installation of the underground service.
23. Id. at 535, 201 S.E. 2d at 767.
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them. On the other hand, when he gives a specification and de-
scribes the use to which he will put the goods, he is looking for
the best performance he can get at a reasonable cost.
Thus, while most courts simply ignored the Code language,
those that did "interpret" it made the cost measure available
under one of the following circumstances:
(1) when the value measure failed to give due concern to the buyer's
particularized needs; or
(2) when the value measure failed to compensate the buyer for the loss
directly and naturally resulting; or
(3) -when the seller could reasonably have foreseen that the value meas-
ure would not compensate the buyer for the breach; or
(4) when it was evident that the buyer was seeking performance of the
product rather than its resale.
These "special circumstances" have a common thread; all re-
flect the court's language in Hadley. Indeed, in that case, the
court allowed damages which "would ordinarily follow from a
breach of contract under these special circumstances so known
and communicated."24 The same phrase in section 2-714(2) may
well have been lifted from Hadley itself, in which case it simply
refers to facts communicated to the buyer.
Perhaps there is yet another situation where "special circum-
stances" would permit the cost rather than the value measure. As
noted earlier, the policy of the Code is to put the aggrieved party
in as good a position as performance would have put him. There-
fore, if the value measure fails to achieve this overall Code objec-
tive, that fact alone should allow the shift to a measure of
damages other than the usual or standard one.
In any event, the cases make it evident that the courts have had
little trouble with the "special circumstances" requirement, and it
is relatively safe to predict that the cost measure would be al-
lowed in our hypothetical case.
IH. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
Once the direct damages have been ascertained, the aggrieved
buyer will then turn to section 2-714(3) which, pursuant to section
2-715, provides, in a proper case, for incidental and consequential
damages in addition to direct damages. That section reads:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include ex-
penses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially rea-
24. 9 Ex. 354-355, 156 Eng. Rep. 151 (1854) (emphasis added).
sonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effect-
ing cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover
or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.
As has been noted in the analysis of section 2-714, an aggrieved
buyer can make a larger direct damage recovery than would be
possible using the value measure where "special circumstances"
are present. Additional recovery for incidental and consequential
damages is available, however, only in a "proper case.
25 It
would appear, therefore, that "special circumstances" are not re-
quired as a prerequisite to incidental and consequential damages.
They are recoverable "in a proper case" whether or not "special
circumstances" exist. One would assume that the terms are not
synonomous, for if the drafters of the Code had intended them to
have the same meaning, would they not have used the same term
twice? Since different language was used, would it not be im-
proper statutory construction is to treat them as synonomous?
What, then, is meant by a "proper case"? One meaning is sup-
plied in section 2-715(2) (a). Therein, consequential damages are
proper when the seller, at the time of contracting, had reason to
know of the possibility of loss based on the general or particular
needs of the buyer. Virtually everyone concedes that subsection
(2) (a) springs from Hadley v. Baxendale. Professor Grant Gil-
more has called that case a "fixed star in the jurisprudential
firmament."26 Professor Richard Danzig, however, in an equally
fascinating contribution 27 suggests it would be more appropriate
to say that the star needs fixing. At the least, he suggests that the
rule of Hadley will become too firmly entrenched even as it be-
comes outmoded. Among other reasons, he suggests that in mass-
transactions a seller cannot plausibly engage in an individualized
contemplation of the consequences of a breach and an appropri-
ate tailoring of the transaction. He recognizes, however, that
many believe that the market system will become distorted un-
less losses are borne by those in the best position to avoid them
- the breachers. 28
The debate over the proper method for determining the extent
25. See U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
26. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 49 (1974).
27. R. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STiDIES 249 (1975).
28. Id. at 2.
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of liability for consequential damages continues to rage. The
drafters of section 2-715 could have settled the dispute by plain
language, but instead adopted a text as ambiguous as the court's
language in Hadley. Only the Official Comments to section 2-715
are bold enough to choose "foreseeability" and to reject the "tacit
agreement" test. What is plain, however, is that liability of our
bolt seller, at least for the very considerable consequential dam-
ages that may result in this case, depends upon judicial interpre-
tation of section 2-715(2) (a). This interpretation requires a
preliminary examination of the cases that preceded its adoption.
A. Pre-Code Foreseeability and the Inroads of Tacit Agreement
An examination of Hadley and the cases that immediately fol-
lowed it shows the foreseeability concept to be one of limitation
on recovery by plaintiffs. Liability would not lie for special dam-
ages which were not within the contemplation of the parties un-
less the defendant possessed knowledge of special circumstances
indicating that the plaintiff would, in the event of breach, sustain
special losses - those arising other than in the ordinary course of
events.
Many commentators have said the rule gained outright accept-
ance by the courts and that it did not come under fire until about
fifty years later. At that time, its detractors included Justice
Holmes and the United States Supreme Court. Holmes, in
authoring the Court's 1903 opinion in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co.,29 was confronted with a case involving an agree-
ment for the purchase of cotton seed oil. The buyer had sent cars
from Kentucky to Texas to no avail due to seller's breach. The
buyer claimed the difference between the contract price and the
market value of the oil. It also sought the special expense of
sending the cars to Texas, and for the loss of their use. In deny-
ing recovery for these foreseeable consequences, Justice Holmes
first delineated the difference between tort liability and contract
liability:
When a man commits a tort, he incurs, by force of the law, a liability to
damages, measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract, he
incurs, by force of the law, a liability to damages, unless a certain prom-
ised event comes to pass. But, unlike the case of torts, as the contract is
by mutual consent, the parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix
the rule by which the damages are to be measured.... It is true that as
.29. 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
people when contracting contemplate performance, not breach, they com-
monly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the latter event, and
the common rules have been worked out by common sense, which has es-
tablished what the parties probably would have said if they had spoken
about the matter. But a man never can be absolutely certain of perform-
ing any contract when the time of performance arrives, and, in many
cases, he obviously is taking the risk of an event which is wholly, or to an
appreciable extent, beyond his control. The extent of liability in such
cases is likely to be within his contemplation, and, whether it is or not,
should be worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would
have assented to if they had been presented to his mind .... If a contract
is broken, the measure of damages generally is the same, whatever the
cause of the breach. We have to consider, therefore, what the plaintiff
would have been entitled to recover in that case, and that depends on what
liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed con-
sciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it
assumed, when the contract was made.
3 0
Holmes' view had early support. In Hooks Smelting Co. v.
Planters Compress Co.,31 bronze screws were ordered for the pur-
pose of repairing a cotton compress. When they were defective,
the buyer sought damages nearly ten times greater than the gross
amount to be paid for the screws. The court said:
While the fact that the damages are greater than ordinarily follow the
breach of contracts to furnish materials of that value, of course, does not
show that the judgment is wrong, it calls attention to the case as one
somewhat out of the beaten track of damage cases, and we therefore pro-
ceed with some interest to examine the law and the evidence upon which
the judgment is based.3 2
The court proceeded to discuss the facts and the law of Hadley,
and stated, "If we look at what the court actually decided in that
case, it seems itself to support the modification subsequently in-
grafted on the rule as stated in that case, to the effect that mere
notice is not always sufficient to make one liable for special dam-
ages." 33 After further discussion of the foreseeability rule, the
court said:
Now, the first two rules laid down by the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale
have never been questions or doubted; but the third rule - the one we
are asked to enforce in this case - has often been criticised, and many
cases could be cited where the courts have refused to apply it so broadly
as stated in the principal case, for, if thus applied, it would in many cases
result in obvious injustice. Suppose, for instance, that a large manufactur-
ing establishment is driven by power from a single engine, and that, by
reason of an accident to some small but important part of the engine or
machinery, it becomes necessary to stop the operation of the whole plant
until a new part can be made, or the old one repaired. If thereupon a
blacksmith or machinist is called in, and for the price of a few dollars un-
30. Id. at 543-544 (emphasis added).
31. 72 Ark. 275, 79 S.W. 1052 (1904). The cotton compress company ordered
specially made screws at a cost of approximately $700. Due to the fact that the
screws were too large to fit the buyer's machine, the buyer's plant operation was
suspended. As a result of the delay caused by the improperly made screws, the
buyer claimed damages in excess of $5000.
32. Id. at 1055.
33. Id.
[Vol. 6: 85, 1978] Seller's Warranty Liability
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dertakes to make the repairs, but, through some mistake or unskillfulness,
the part supplied by him should fail to fit, requiring it to be remade, and
entailing still further delay, would any court hold that the blacksmith or
machinist could be held liable for all the damages entailed by the delay,
when they were large, in the absence of a contract on his part to be thus
liable, unless the notice and the circumstances under which he made the
contract were such that he ought reasonably to have known that in the
event of his failure to perform his contract the other party would look to
him to make good the loss?
3 4
Holmes' modification of the foreseeability test attracted other
state support as well.35 It was also followed by lower federal
courts prior to 1938 when the federal courts under Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins,36 were no longer obliged to do so. Since that
time, the tacit agreement test has been both accepted and re-
jected. More important, however, is the reaction of the courts to
this issue following adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.
B. Post-Code Applications of the Two Tests
Since the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code, numerous
decisions have been handed down which speak to the issue. In
Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin,37 perhaps the earliest inter-
pretation of section 2-715, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court fol-
lowed the tacit agreement test.38 The court quoted Holmes in
34. Id. at 285, 79 S.W. at 1056.
35. See, e.g., Winslow Elevator & Machine Co. v. Hoffman, 107 Md. 621, 69 A. 394
(1908) where the court expressed its concerns about the foreseeability rule in the
following language:
To fix such a liability upon it upon that ground alone ... would be a star-
tling and dangerous proposition. Under such a rule the plumber, the gas
fitter, the stair builder, or the machinist who defaulted in his contract to
do certain work upon any of the great office buildings might be held liable
for enormous special damages simply because he knew his contract had
reference to such a building.
Id. at 638, 69 A. at 397.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins held, generally, that fed-
eral courts, exercising jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship, must
apply state law as declared by the state's highest court.
37. 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963). When the plaintiff, a dealer of diesel en-
gines, brought a cause of action against Irwin for repair work it performed on his
engine, Irwin counterclaimed for loss of profits that resulted from the engine
breakdowns. The trial court struck the counterclaim and the supreme court af-
firmed stating that no facts were alleged "that would put the plaintiff on guard to
the fact that the defendant would hold plaintiff responsible for any loss of profit
arising from the inability to use the machine in question." Id. at 379.
38. However, since the time of the Keystone decision, the court has reconsid-
ered its interpretation of 2-715. In R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement, 378 A.2d 288
(Pa. 1977), upon discovery that cement blocks failed to meet specifications, plain-
tiff sued for damages resulting from their use in the production of structural floor
and ceiling systems. The court expressly rejected the Keystone interpretation and
Globe and expressly adopted his rationale.
Arkansas remains in the tacit agreement camp. In 1977 the
Supreme Court in Morrow v. First National Bank of Hot
Springs,39 although involving facts inapposite to Article 2 of the
Code, cited Hooks, which had involved a transaction in goods, and
said:
The tacit agreement test, to be sure, has been questioned and was re-
jected by the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code ... We do not
attach great importance to the Commercial Code provision, simply be-
cause the legislature, in adopting a uniform act containing hundreds of
sections, certainly did not specifically and consciously decide that the rule
of the Hooks case should be changed in all situations. We adhere to that
decision.4o
However, the tacit agreement test has more often been rejected
by courts applying section 2-715. In doing so, they often quote the
Official Comments to that section. Although those not enamored
with its statement are quick to point out its lack of status, the
comment provides:
2. Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer in an appropriate case, any
consequential damages which are the result of the seller's breach. The
'tacit agreement' test for the recovery of consequential damages is re-
jected. Although the older rule at common law which made the seller lia-
ble for all consequential damages of which he had 'reason to know' in
advance is followed, the liberality of that rule is modified by refusing to
permit recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the
loss by cover or otherwise.
Thus, according to the Official Comments, the only modification to
the rule of foreseeability is the reasonable ability of the buyer to
prevent the loss by cover or otherwise. Presumably, these are ac-
tions he can and should take after the defect becomes known, not
at the time of contracting.
The tacit agreement test was rejected by Illinois in the case of
Adams v. J. Case Co.,41 where the court referred to the Official
Comment and also stated: "The language of that section should
not be so narrowly construed as to require a prior understanding
or agreement that the seller would be bound for consequential
stated that the proper measure of consequential damages are those of which the
seller "had reason to know and could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise." Id. at 292. "The 'had reason to know' test does not require that it be
shown that the seller contemplated or tacitly agreed to certain consequential dam-
ages. A seller 'had reason to know' that which a reasonable person would have
known." Id.
39. 550 S.W. 2d 429 (Ark. 1977). In Morrow, coin collectors brought suit against
the bank for the bank's failure to notify, as promised, that safety deposit boxes
were available in the new bank building. A coin collection was stolen from one of
the collector's homes several days later.
40. Id. at 431.
41. 125 111. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E. 2d 1 (1970). In Adams, defendant supplied
plaintiff with a defective tractor and, by failing to make necessary repairs in a
timely manner, caused plaintiff to lose 810 work hours at $12 per hour. The court
allowed recovery of the lost profits as reasonably foreseeable.
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damages in the event of his breach. If that is the holding ... of
the Keystone [case] it must be rejected."42
California may also be in the foreseeability camp. In Gerwin v.
Southeastern California Association of Seventh Day Adventists,43
a District Court of Appeals quoted section 2-715, indicating that it
codified the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, and stating the test to
be one of foreseeability. The court also cited with approval sev-
eral pre-Code cases which had followed Hadley.
In Falcon Tankers Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc.,44 in 1976, a Dela-
ware superior court quoted section 2-715, footnoted rejection of
the tacit agreement test by the Official Comments, and said: "By
the great weight of authority, consequential damages are only
granted where the breach is a proximate cause of the losses and
the damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time of con-
tracting."45 The Delaware court may well be correct in its count
of those jurisdictions rejecting the tacit agreement test. Idaho,46
Minnesota,47 Nebraska,48 North Carolina,49 and Texas50 seem in-
42. Id. at 405, 261 N.E. 2d at 9.
43. 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1971).
44. 355 A.2d 898 (Del. 1976). In Falcon Tankers, a tanker owner sued the ship-
builder for damages caused by long periods of "down time." The shipbuilder, in
turn, sued the pump manufacturer who, in turn, sued the supplier of component
parts.
45. Id. at 907.
46. Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968). In this action for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness, hogs sold by the plaintiff were found to
be diseased and unfit for breeding. The buyer also claimed that the infected hogs
communicated their disease to his healthy hogs and that, as a result, he had to sell
all the hogs for butchering rather than breeding. The court allowed the damages,
stating that they were reasonably foreseeable.
47. Bemidji Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 250 N.W. 2d 185 (Minn. 1977). The
buyer alleged breach of express warranty that cattle had been vaccinated for ship-
ping fever and breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The court held that
the buyer could recover consequential damages for the loss of the calves and for
the increased costs of feed and care. However, in this case, the damages were lim-
ited due to the buyer's failure to mitigate his damages.
48. National Farmers Organization, Inc. v. McCook Feed and Supply Co., 196
Neb. 424, 243 N.W. 2d 335 (1976). The seller delivered only 1,714 bushels of corn to
the buyer pursuant to a contract to sell 90,000 bushels. The buyer sued to collect
lost profits, claiming that the seller had reason to know, at the time of contracting,
that the buyer had expected to resell the corn.
49. Gurney Industries, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588
(4th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff contracted with defendant contractor to construct a yarn-
spinning mill. The court held that the contractor's officials, as they were exper-
ienced in the design and manufacture of spinning wheels, knew or could have
foreseen the probable result of an ill-equipped mill (increased operating costs and
decreased production). Thus, as the operating losses were foreseeable, they were
allowable as damages.
terested only in foreseeability. If that is insufficient bad news for
the tacit agreement camp, on October 7, 1977, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania,51 the earliest post-Code adopter of the tacit
agreement test, changed its mind and rejected tacit agreement in
favor of foreseeability. The court did not say why Keystone incor-
rectly favored the tacit agreement test, other than to refer to
works of prominent legal authorities who also fail to explain why
foreseeability is enough. The court seemed impressed by the fact
that the Keystone result was out of harmony with the text of both
section 2-715(2) and Comments 2 and 3. The court, as do so many
others, quoted the rejection language of Comment 2, which lan-
guage also makes no case for either proposition; instead, it simply
rejects tacit agreement. Braucher and Reigert say the trend is
against the tacit agreement test.52 Professor Corbin also had
joined with those who approved of the foreseeability test. In or-
der to charge the defendant with the loss he said it was sufficient
to find that it was one that ordinarily follows the breach of such a
contract in the usual course of events or that reasonable men in
the position of the parties would have foreseen as a probable re-
sult of the breach.5 3 The loss is recoverable apparently because
the buyer communicated "special circumstances" to the seller.
IV. CONCLUSION
The net result of an analysis of the relevant cases would appear
to support a prediction that, in most jurisdictions, the buyer in
our hypothetical situation will be able to recover its full cost of re-
placing the defective bolt, and it will likewise be able to recover
special damages in the amount of its losses caused by the shut-
down of the plant. At least, it seems that at the present time the
buyer is entitled to such damages providing it proves "a proper
case"; evidently meaning only that such losses were foreseeable
by the seller.54 The total of these two claims may be staggering,
50. Ligon v. Chas. P. Davis Hardware, Inc., 492 S.W. 2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973). This case involved a breach of implied warranty action, brought by a store
owner against the installer of a burglar alarm system. The burglar alarm failed to
activate when the store was burglarized and the owner suffered a loss of merchan-
dise.
51. lI. L mpus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 378 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1977).
See note 38 rpra and accompanying text.
52. R. BRUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
313 (1977).
53. 5 A. Co~mN, CoNTRAcTs §1010, at 79 (1964).
54. Earlier in this article it was suggested that it would be improper statutory
construction to conclude that "special circumstances" under section 2-714(2)
meant the same thing as "in a proper case" under section 2-714(3). Yet, that is the
apparent interpretation of the courts.
In both instances, the courts seem interested only in ascertaining whether or
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but, nevertheless, it appears that we must answer the intermina-
ble rhetorical question presented by the court in Hooks55 by say-
ing: "Yes, indeed there are such courts, and they appear to be in
the clear majority. The blacksmith is liable in spite of the fact
that he may have exercised the greatest care in the manufacture
of this inexpensive item."
V. PROPOSAL: EXAMINE THE ROLE OF THE BUYER
As for the rule which so easily casts upon the offender the bur-
den of the total loss, it is easy enough to say that when special
circumstances have been communicated to the seller, any loss
that would ordinarily follow would be a foreseeable loss. How-
ever, to say that it is a foreseeable loss is not necessarily to say it
is one that must be borne by the breacher. In the negotiation
stage, should we expect a seller to be contemplating or attempt-
ing to understand "special circumstances" which might inordi-
nately magnify his ordinary liability? A breach on his part, and
its possible extraordinary consequences, are probably the fur-
thest things from his mind. Is not Professor Danzig on the right
track when he says a mass-transactions seller cannot plausibly
engage in an individualized contemplation of the consequences of
breach? Is the trend to foreseeability only a "snow ball effect"
generated primarily by an Official Comment?
In our hypothetical fact situation, is not the buyer in a far supe-
rior position to know the dire consequences that may flow from a
defective bolt sold to him? He knows whether or not that bolt will
be buried under tons of expensive machinery, all of which may
have to be torn apart to get at the offender once it is identified.
He knows, or is in a superior position to know, whether it will be
simply placed on a shelf. Thus, if the consequences of the bolt's
defectiveness are other than those that would ordinarily flow in
not the loss claimed was foreseeable by the seller. This difficulty in working with
the Code is also discussed in note 21 supra. It would seem that the proper statu-
tory construction would be to the effect that "special circumstances" under 2-
714(2) are pertinent in deciding whether warranty damages should be determined
by the cost rather than the value measure, for that subsection speaks only to the
issue of warranty damages. Determination of "a proper case," however, seemingly
should be important only to see whether or not incidental and/or consequential
damages are also recoverable. (Even if that is the correct construction, it must be
admitted that foreseeability may well be the determinant factor in both subsec-
tions.)
55. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
the usual course of events, should not the buyer be expected to
protect himself?
Obviously, in the past, successful arguments have been made
that the buyer need not do so. However, are those arguments im-
pressive today, when the buyer is a merchant or occupies some
sort of professional buyer status? Are there not special considera-
tions required when the purchase is in the context of a commer-
cial agreement? Is there a viable middle ground in this debate?
There is, of course a way in which the seller can protect him-
self. Section 2-719(3) of the Code allows the seller to limit and
perhaps even exclude his liability. Indeed any purchaser of goods
is beginning to learn what it is like to live in a world of limited
liability. Is all of this sea of limitation which presently engulfs us
necessary, at least in commercial contracts?
There is no attempt herein to suggest a change in the rules
which most properly place on the offending seller the responsibil-
ity for all losses which ordinarily or usually flow from the breach.
Instead, the thought thrown upon the table for discussion is
whether the buyer, when he is a merchant, should be able to sad-
dle the breaching seller with extraordinary losses without receiv-
ing from the seller an agreement, tacit or otherwise, that the
seller will bear that special loss.
It would not be unique to examine the role of one of the parties
in formulating a new rule. The Code, in several instances, has
rules that are applicable only when one party is a merchant, 56 or
when both buyer and seller are merchants.5 7 Why not have a pro-
vision pertaining to remedies which would have application to lia-
bility for defective products only when the buyer occupies some
sort of merchant status?5 8 Professor Corbin in his work on con-
tracts said: "That portion of the field of law that is classified and
56. See, e.g., §§2-205, 2-209(2), 2-314, 2-403(2) and 2-509(3).
57. These sections are fewer in number. See, e.g., §§ 2-207(2), 2-209(2) and 2-
609(2).
58. In suggesting a change to the remedies provisions at least two factors must
be considered. First, what sort of merchant buyer should be given this added
responsibilty? Section 2-104(1) now provides three different definitions of a
merchant. While it would be desirable to avoid adding a fourth, it is not at all cer-
tain that the energy facility buyer would properly be termed a dealer in goods of
the kind, a business practices merchant, or an employer of others holding them-
selves out as having the necessary knowledge or skill. Thus some other provision
is dictated. Perhaps the simplest solution would be to add another sentence to the
present subsection. It could read: "In determining damages for breach of warranty
of defective goods accepted by the seller, 'merchant' also means a person who
purchases the goods for use in his business."
Second, should there be a new section pertaining to warranty damages or could
the recommendation contained in this article be accomplished by a revision of the
present provision? Remembering that section 2-715 is a part of other remedy pro-
visions as well (See 2-712(2) and 2-713(1)), any change to section 2-715 becomes
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described as the law of contracts attempts the realization of rea-
sonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a
promise."5 9 Is such a goal served by a rule that subjects a sup-
plier of goods to unlimited liability for a defective product, a prod-
uct that may have been produced with the utmost of care, simply
by having received knowledge of "special circumstances" from a
better informed, merchant buyer? Would placing some responsi-
bility on a professional buyer promote the simplification, clarifica-
tion, and modernization of the law governing commercial
transactions? That, after all, is the underlying purpose and policy
of the Uniform Commercial Code.60
most significant. With those thoughts in mind, the following minimum changes
(indicated by italicized portions) should accomplish the objective:
1.) U.C.C. § 2-714 would read:
(1) .
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proxi-
mate damages of a different amount. If the buyer is a merchant
such different amount shall not exceed the contract price of ac-
cepted defective goods unless the seller has expressly or im-
pliedly agreed to such excessive damages in the event of breach
by him.
(3) ....
2.) U.C.C. § 2-715 would read:
(1) .(2) Subject to the provisions of section 2-715 (3), consequential dam-
ages resulting from seller's breach include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty,
(3) Unless expressly or impliedly otherwise agreed, a merchant
buyer shall not receive consequential damages resulting from
acceptance of defective goods.
59. 1 A. CORBN, CONTRACTS § 1, at 2 (1964).
60. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2)(a).

